We discuss recent cases of Chinese buyout activity in the OECD (especially in the US and the EU) in resource and manufacturing sectors. While most of the buyout attempts have been unsuccessful, they can serve as a catalyst for a wider discussion on the implications for global arrangements over cross border acquisitions. Three specific issues are discussed. The first is the subsidization of purchase raised in the OECD in response to the advancing of low-or no-interest loans by the Chinese Central Bank to companies investing abroad. The second is the transparency of entities involved in the buyout attempt. Most Chinese companies have close ties to the multiple levels of government and are not subject to the standard reporting requirements as required of OECD companies. The third involves national security concerns in the OECD and the possibility of acquiring sensitive technology by Chinese companies when they purchase companies abroad. These issues have not been addressed in the existing OECD/WTO investment policy initiatives and have yet to be discussed in the global fora.
Introduction
This paper discusses the recent wave of (both actual and proposed) buyouts by Chinese companies of entities outside China. While the majority of these have not resulted in completed transactions, we discuss whether these can be a catalyst for a wider discussion of the implications for global arrangements over cross border acquisitions.
Chinese outward foreign direct investment (FDI) for some years has been relatively small (in the US$3-4 billion range in 2004) and heavily concentrated on both greenfield and joint venture activity, much of it occurring in Hong Kong. In the last year, a change which has occurred is both a focus on direct acquisition and the emergence of potentially large transactions, some in the US$15-20 billion range, and with a focus well beyond The overarching feature that we stress and which goes well beyond China is the apparent absence of globally agreed disciplines covering not only cross border 3 acquisitions, but more broadly all cross border factor flows. This situation stands in contrast to the goods and services flows covered by the WTO. Both the failed multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) and WTO competition policy negotiations did not touch directly on the newer issues in recent debate on Chinese buyouts, and neither do earlier bilateral trade and investment treaties.
At first glance this upsurge of new outward Chinese FDI strikes outside observers as odd. China is after all, still a relatively capital scarce economy with a large pool of low wage labour, and development policy there remains focused on attracting inward platform FDI to combine with low wage labour to fuel further export and GDP growth.
To begin exporting large amounts of capital through large foreign acquisitions when this broad stance of development policy towards inward FDI remains unchanged seemingly calls for an explanation.
A number of factors underlie this recent upsurge in Chinese cross border acquisition activity. One is large accumulated Central Bank reserves in China (close to US$700 billion), and a seeming change in policy stance by the Central Bank of advancing low interest loans to SOEs for foreign acquisitions rather than continued accumulation of US treasury notes. Chinese concerns over security for supply of resource inputs (especially oil) for Chinese manufacturing enterprises also motivate the change in activity. And for private manufacturing groups in China, the use of foreign acquisitions as a way of obtaining distribution networks in the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for domestic manufacturing production (insourcing for want of a better term) seems to be a factor. The picture is one of macro imbalances 4 combining with pragmatic niche driven foreign acquisition activity in which factors behind both Chinese SOEs and private groups, and resource and manufacturing acquisitions differ.
With both Chinese trade surpluses and inward FDI continuing to grow, and most likely outward Chinese FDI growing correspondingly, broader systemic implications are likely to factor in discussion of buyout situations. Mundell (1957) years ago noted the formal equivalence between goods flows and factor flows suggesting an equivalent organizational form for GATT/WTO for goods flows. Given the recent failures first of the MAI negotiation in the OECD, and then of the competition policy negotiations in the WTO, no global rules apply to interventions by governments regulating these forms of factor flow. Issues of subsidization, mutually agreed bindings on barriers to acquisitions, and transparency of organizational form of acquiring firms are thus newly raised.
We discuss existing policy initiatives both in the OECD and the WTO with respect to investment and competition policy in light of the new issues raised by Chinese acquisitions. Thus far, central banks around the world have not engaged in extending low interest loans for foreign acquisitions, but the policy structure in China with large communally owned production units (by national, provincial and municipal governments) makes this logical from a Chinese standpoint.
A issue is whether other countries should now seek to link approval of individual transactions to negotiations (or renegotiations) of bilateral investment treaties. A broader approach is to seek a global regulatory framework covering purchases by prospective foreign parent entities, a matter rarely touched on by previous WTO and OECD and transferring excess production capacity abroad. 6 Other studies point to non-economic reasons for Chinese enterprises investing abroad, such as the possibility of gaining residency rights and other benefits in the host country for managerial staff (such as health 4 CAITEC, WDA (2005) . 5 See for example: Hong and Sun (2004) , Deng (2004 and , Wall (1997) , Wong and Chan (2003) , Yang (2003) , Young, Huang and McDermott (1996) , Wu and Chen (2001) , UNCTAD (2003) , Wang (2002) and others. 6 CAITEC, WDA (2005). 8 services, social security, and access to education). The use of overseas investments as a way to circumvent official Chinese restrictions on access to foreign exchange and foreign capital markets is also raised as potential factor.
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The decision by Chinese companies to buy foreign companies is also often linked to an intent to relocate manufacturing activity to China to benefit from lower labour costs while keeping existing distribution networks in the host country of the acquired business.
8 Recent widely publicized Chinese bids for large firms in the OECD are also The changes taking place in Chinese outward oriented foreign investment are well illustrated by recent takeover attempts by Chinese companies. We summarize them in Table 1 , and then discuss each in more detail. The circumstances of each episode vary, and firm information on the terms of the arrangements entered into in each case is not 10 always readily available, but the factors involved in each case seem clear. Chevron's vice-chairman, Peter Robertson, called for the bid to be referred to the WTO 14 on the grounds that China was buying "a critical resource like energy with free money".
Resource Company Situations

CNPC/Yukos
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CNOOC's response was to call for a review of the bid by the Committee of Foreign Investments in the US (CFIUS) arguing the controversy over the bid was purely political.
CNOOC's representatives pointed out that 70% of Unocal's oil and gas reserves were located in Asia, and that only 1% of American consumption was secured by Unocal's American production.
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Several American commentators argued that as long as there was a worldwide market for oil, controlling oil and gas reserves was not vital for national security. 22 Other analysts emphasised that China's foreign reserves were held mostly in US treasury bills, suggesting that if the Chinese stopped buying these, interest rates in the US could rise which could then increase inflation and decrease consumer spending. 23 But it was also argued this could happen if the Chinese decided to retaliate against any politically driven blockage of Chinese takeovers. In addition to treating oil as a national security product, concerns were also expressed over Chinese access to industrial technology that could be used for military purposes. The issue was Unocal's underwater terrain-mapping technology which, it was argued, could also be used for military submarine navigation.
CNPC/PetroKazakhstan
A further resource related acquisition involves the China National Petroleum Corporation (SAIC) and Nanjing Automobile Corporation. Rover had been placed in receivership following bankruptcy, and negotiations involved both the receiver and the UK government since local employment issues were raised. Earlier in the year, after a first failed attempt to take over Rover's assets, SAIC bought the rights to sell two Rover models in China. It was believed that each of the two bids would result in the relocation of some of Rover's activity to China, but each also proposed to keep part of the production in the UK, specifically MG sports cars and high value saloons. SAIC planned to relocate engine design and production to China while Nanjing would move Rover's small-and medium-sized cars production lines. Rover was later sold to Nanjing
Automotive Corporation for an undisclosed sum.
Other Recent Chinese Foreign Mergers and Acquisitions
Additional applies the second of these arguments appears less relevant.
The analogous arguments to these used to justify countervailing duties as measures to offset subsidization of goods flows seem more difficult to make in the foreign acquisition case. Generalized arguments in favour of trade remedy laws often centre on concerns over predatory pricing by foreign suppliers in domestic markets, acknowledgement of the seeming unfairness of preferential foreign suppliers treatment, and arguments that without a trade remedy safety net in place domestic political coalitions of home producers would be even less willing to accept the outcomes of internationally agreed negotiations which lower tariff barriers.
In discussing their application to subsidization of cross border acquisition, we note that a preponderance of the arguments made in favour of trade remedy laws are discounted by academic economists. Many argue the illogicality on national (as distinct from narrower producer) interest grounds of limiting the opportunities available to buy goods from abroad more cheaply if they are being dumped or subsidized into local markets. They often dispute the presence of predatory pricing since new entrants would return to domestic markets and undercut any foreign competitors if they attempted to raise prices above competitive levels after engaging in pricing behaviour to drive out domestic competition. Also, many dispute arguments applying notions of fairness to pricing behaviour, arguing that fairness considerations more appropriately apply to the evaluation of market outcomes on distributional grounds, such as who gains and who loses in income or economic welfare, not to the setting of prices per se.
Applied to cross border investment and acquisition issues, it is difficult to assert arguments of predation since asset acquisitions are one time transactions. Indeed, concerning national (and shareholder) interests, the argument would seem to be that foreign subsidization of acquisitions is welcomed since domestic sellers of assets will typically receive a higher price. Also, generalized arguments of fairness would receive a similar treatment to those made on the goods side. And arguments about safety nets and 25 the political acceptability of negotiated liberalization affecting other instruments would seem not to apply since liberalization of other instruments does not arise.
In short, generalized arguments about fairness and subsidization of foreign acquisitions of domestic firms will likely continue to be made as Chinese buyouts occur;
however, but these seem to apply largely to the management of acquired firms whose managerial positions may suffer. While the subsidy issue could be a lead issue for a new international negotiation covering global barriers to factors flows, in dealing with issues of foreign acquisitions, new arguments rather than analogies to dumping and subsidization of goods flows would seemingly need to surface.
Transparency
A second issue at stake is the transparency of structure and organizational form of the entities involved. 36 The concern in the OECD is that many Chinese SOEs accrue losses and do not comply with codes of corporate governance and transparency to which OECD companies largely adhere. Acquiring firms may experience financial difficulties causing later adjustment problems, and be motivated by politically appointed management seeking non profit motives.
Understanding in Western literature of how Chinese SOEs operate is not that well developed and there are many diverse forms such enterprises take, with national, provincial and municipal governments involved, and also joint ventures. Recently, Whalley and Zhang (2005) have suggested a model of Chinese SOEs as entities with politically appointed management whose losses are typically recapitalized by the banking system and who often operate so as to maximize size rather than profit. This is largely attributed to the personal networking benefits that accrue to management from size. As such, a concern for OECD policy makers is the involvement of large viable OECD companies with entities whose financial security is intertwined with domestic political structure in China. The fear underscores possible bankruptcies, adjustment costs, and disruption from shifting political tides in China.
The precise form that ownership and corporate control over collectively-owned and controlled enterprises in China takes is both complicated and puzzling. The The principles aim to "assist OECD and non-OECD governments in their efforts to 37 Investor Fact Sheet available through www.pc.ibm.com/ww/lenovo/investor_factsheet.html 38 Bigsten, Liu and Zheng (2002) , Xu (2000 and . 39 Fan and Wang (2004) and Tan, Wang and Zhang (2005) cited in Liu (2005). evaluate and improve the legal, institutional and regulatory framework for corporate governance in their countries, and to provide guidance and suggestions for stock exchanges, investors, corporations, and other parties that have a role in the process of developing good corporate governance". 40 These principles characterize transparency as the timely and accurate disclosure of all information relating to a corporation, including financial and operating results of companies (balance sheets, profit and loss statements, cash flow statements), objectives, major share ownership and voting rights, the selection process and remuneration policy of the board and key executives. It also includes any foreseeable risk factors, the content of any internal corporate governance code and human resources policies, and information on related party 41 transactions that may impact the performance of the company are all to be disclosed. Observance of these guidelines is however at the discretion of national regulators.
Most stock exchanges in the world adopt similar requirements for publicly listed companies. Most are rigid and detailed, especially in relation to accounting statements and audits. For instance, the London Stock Exchange requires at least three-year record of independent revenue earning business and a normal, commercial based relationship with any 30% or more shareholder such that the listed company is capable of operating and making decisions independently of the shareholder at all times. 42 Hong Kong Stock
Exchange requirements are at least HK$50 million profit in the last three years and 40 OECD (2004) , OECD Principles of Corporate Governance available through www.oecd.org. 41 A related party is defined includes entities that control or are under common control with the company, significant shareholders, members of their families and key management personnel. 42 London Stock Exchange Listing Rules accessed through www.globalfinanceonline.com/london-stockexchange-listing-rules.html.
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require that a company's accounts be prepared in accordance with Hong Kong or International Financial Reporting Standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the US. 43 The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) listing standards require aggregate three years pretax earnings of US$10 million as per domestic listing standards or US$100 million as per worldwide standards. 44 NYSE rules also stress the importance of independent directors and an audit committee. The issue is whether these requirements and any additional standards should be set for foreign acquisitions by non-listed entities in light of concerns over the Chinese buyout situation.
National Security
Most countries exhibit laws and regulations that restrict foreign investments in industries considered sensitive to national security or sovereignty. Some regulations provide state authorities the right to review proposed foreign investment. Industries in question usually include: telecommunications, air transport, public utilities, research, production and trade in arms, ammunition, and explosives. Some countries also restrict and review foreign investments due to their potential impact on public safety and health, public order, national economy or fledgling national industries. Chinese buyouts seemingly raise no particular security concerns. In the 1980s, similar concerns were raised over US acquisitions by Japanese companies. As a result, in 1988 the American Congress approved the Exon-Florio Provision of the Defence Production Act which gave the President the authority to block any foreign acquisitions, mergers, or takeovers of American companies deemed threatening to US national security. The legislation did not define national security leaving this term to be broadly interpreted and administered by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).
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The Exon-Florio provision, amended in 1993 (called the Byrd Amendment), required that CFIUS investigate proposed foreign acquisitions if the acquiring company was controlled by or acted on behalf of a foreign government. 46 The considerations which guide CFIUS include among others: how the potential foreign acquisition might affect the technological leadership of the US in areas related to national security, domestic production needed for national defence projects, capacity and capability of domestic industries related to national security, and weapons sales to countries supporting terrorism.
CFIUS proceedings are confidential and official information on the reviews is whitheld. According to Jackson (2005) , CFIUS has investigated 25 cases out of 1,500 notifications. 13 transactions were withdrawn upon notice of a full CFIUS review, twelve were sent to the President for final decision and only one was prohibited. The prohibited 60 For a discussion of BITs see for example Peterson (2004) , Neumayer (2004) , Guzman (2004) . 61 See www.unctad.org/iia
Concluding Remarks
In light of recent Chinese proposed purchases of OECD companies, we argue whether there should be globally negotiated rules covering cross border acquisitions, perhaps similar to those governing international goods and services trade under WTO and GATT.
The recent growth of Chinese outward FDI is related not only to growing Chinese foreign reserves due to trade surpluses and inward FDI, but also to recent changes in official Chinese policy, now encouraging domestic companies to invest abroad. The approval process for foreign investment has been simplified and companies (especially state-owned enterprises) investing abroad in projects related to securing domestic energy demand, acquiring advanced technology and new markets, are given credit support at preferential interest rates.
The recent, widely publicized, cases of Chinese buyout attempts of companies in other countries suggest that the main motives for outward FDI are access to resources (CNOOC, CNPC and Minmetals cases), new technology (Lenovo case) and distribution networks in the target country (Lenovo, Haier and Nanjing cases). The Chinese bids we document comprised mostly of cash (between US$1.3 billion and 17.5 billion with the higher end offers being in the oil industry) and most are also based on low interest loans from the Chinese state controlled banks.
Subsidization of attempted foreign acquisitions may be argued as an unfair business practice, but simple analogies between goods and factors flows seemingly do not fully support the need for a new international negotiation covering global factor flows. The issue of transparency of entities involved, especially the opaqueness and financial insecurity of Chinese SOEs, raises concerns whether they are able to manage the purchased businesses in such a way that it sustains the security and stability of local workforce, avoids the disruption of local markets and does not fuel suspicion of corruption. Whether they should be subjected to internationally agreed corporate disclosure standards, comply with standard accountability requirements, and be the subject of restraint where potential adjustment issues are posed by financial weakness are issues. China's emergence as a global investor may serve not only as a catalyst for a wider discussion covering not only cross border acquisitions, but also more broadly for cross border flows of factors.
The paper also highlights the discussion of Chinese buyouts and national security concerns involving the transfer of sensitive technologies, efficiency of the economy in the target country and finally the security of resource supply. These issues are most often subject to domestic regulations including an approval process and are heavily dependent on political reasoning.
It can be argued that the Chinese FDI should not be treated differently that those of any other country and that Chinese companies cannot be subject to any special rules otherwise not applicable to other entities; however, the closeness of the Chinese government and Chinese companies as well as financial structure of the Chinese economy, prompt questions on fairness and transparency of transactions. Given China's surging economic growth, trade surpluses, accumulation of foreign reserves, and changes 40 in the official policy stance one can expect growing involvement of Chinese companies abroad. The Chinese buyout attempts can thus serve as a catalyst to a broader, systemic discussion on global factor flows rules and policy response to governmental interventions in cross border acquisitions.
